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Andrew Heiss :rstats: (@andrew) · 10/2022 · Tröts: 1.944 · Folger: 4.096
Do 25.07.2024 19:49
New paper accepted at International Interactions: "Pandemic Pass?" where we look to see if countries derogated from intl human rights obligations as a way to cover up worse abuses during pandemic. Turns out they didn't!
It has fancy Bayesian models and pretty plots, and it's my first published paper written fully in #QuartoPub
• Preprint: https://stats.andrewheiss.com/mountainous-mackerel/ and https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/y8ked
• Code: https://github.com/andrewheiss/mountainous-mackerel
• Complete Docker container for replication: https://github.com/andrewheiss/mountainous-mackerel-docker
Pandemic Pass? Treaty Derogations and Human Rights Practices During COVID-19 This research note asks whether states issuing pandemic-era human rights treaty derogations implemented emergency provisions as intended or used them to abuse human rights during a time of crisis. In an effort to combat the COVID-19 pandemic, many countries declared states of emergency and derogated (temporarily suspended) from their international human rights treaty obligations. Using data from the Varieties of Democracy PanDem dataset and the Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker, we find that states that derogated from their international human rights obligations imposed emergency measures that were temporary and did not violate non-derogable rights. On the other hand, states that did not derogate were more likely impose discriminatory measures, enact emergency measures without time limits and violate non-derogable rights. Our results support the role that flexibility mechanisms such as derogations play in international law and show that states are being sincere about their intentions and not, generally, using these mechanisms to cover abusive behavior.
Plot showing the predicted effects of imposing specific emergency public health measures over first 15 months of the COVID pandemic, split by whether states formally derogated from the ICCPR
Plot showing the predicted effects of imposing specific emergency public health measures over first 15 months of the COVID pandemic, split by whether states formally derogated from the ICCPR
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